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COMFORTABLE BEDS, A CHURCH PEW,
A CEMETERY LOT, ONE HOG,
ONE PIG, SIX SHEEP, ONE COW,
A YOLK OF OXEN OR A HORSE, AND YOUR
NOTARY SEAL: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT EXEMPTIONS
LOWELL P. BOTTRELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to filing bankruptcy and meeting with counsel, most debtors
probably wonder if they will be able to keep any property after they file.
After meeting with counsel, debtors are reassured that they can keep
certain property such as their house and other property, but that they
cannot keep property like cash. This may perplex the average individual
because it seems strange that the debtor may keep a home worth several
thousand dollars yet they cannot keep the $200 or $300 cash they have
in their checking accounts. This situation raises concerns of whether the
exemptions that are allowed to debtors are based on common sense or
on something entirely different.
The sole purpose of this article is to initiate debate about restructur-
ing the exemption scheme in North Dakota, Minnesota, and elsewhere.
The purpose of this article is not to discuss all of the unusual exemptions
that exist today, nor is the purpose to discuss all of the assets that a
debtor may claim as exempt in some hypothetical or theoretical bank-
ruptcy. This article does not attempt to analyze every intricacy involved
in the development of the patchwork of exemptions that exists in many
states today. What this article does do is stand for the proposition that
state exemption schemes should be modernized to be more
user-friendly. This author is certain that both creditors and debtors will
criticize this article. Debtors will contend that restructuring the exemp-
tion scheme will deprive them of exemptions, and creditors will contend
that the exemptions are, at present, already too liberal. The debate must
begin somewhere-let it begin here.
The problems with the exemptions as they are structured today are
numerous. For example, the existing exemption scheme fosters improp-
er pre-bankruptcy planning in that it encourages debtors to convert
non-exempt assets into exempt form on the eve of bankruptcy. It fosters
uncertainty because neither the debtor nor the creditors are certain
whether the assets will be considered exempt in the future or whether the
debtor will lose his or her discharge as a result of any improper
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pre-bankruptcy planning. It fosters inflexibility because the debtor is
not certain if he or she wants to continue in his or her current occupa-
tion, but is being advised that he or she can obtain a greater lien avoid-
ance and more exemptions because of that lien avoidance if he or she
continues the same occupation. Finally, exemption schemes lack practi-
cal application because cash is not exempt in some states, yet if the
debtor uses cash as a downpayment on a home, it is exempt. All of the
above problems increase litigation and consequently, the cost to the
litigants.
This article will first discuss the policy reasons courts have espoused
as the foundation for exemptions. Next, the article will provide the
constitutional footing for exemptions in North Dakota and Minnesota.'
The discussion will then turn to the types of exemptions that are avail-
able to debtors, the case law developed from the various state exemp-
tions, and the litigation in the courts today concerning pre-bankruptcy
planning. Finally, the author will suggest a starting point for discussion
which is not meant to be a solution, but rather-a starting point. This
starting point suggests that the pigeon hole exemptions in North Dakota
and Minnesota be abolished and that both state legislatures provide a flat
"wild card" exemption to debtors for a certain dollar amount, which the
debtor may use to exempt whatever assets the debtor chooses. The
rationale behind this suggestion is that debtors would then not have to
play games with their exemptions for pre-bankruptcy planning purposes
and creditors would know that the debtor, in any circumstance, would be
entitled to a certain flat dollar amount of exemptions. Creditors and
debtors would know, upon entering into financial transactions with one
another, what amount the debtor could claim as exempt, and would not
have to consider whether the property is homestead property, 2 cash value
life insurance, or a musical instrument.
1. This article primarily addresses the statutory exemption schemes in Minnesota and North
Dakota, where this author practices. By this article, the author does not suggest that there be any
uniform federal exemptions. However, the wild card exemption, this author suggests, could be applied
to the federal exemptions under II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988), instead of the patchwork of exemptions
that are provided by Congress.
2. If the homestead exemption is not properly waived in a North Dakota mortgage, then the
mortgage may not be enforceable against the property. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-05.1 (Supp. 1995);
Red River State Bank v. Reierson, 533 N.W.2d 683, 686-87 (N.D. 1995).
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II. THE POLICY OF EXEMPTIONS
The court-enunciated policy 3 for providing exemptions is that
exemptions are necessary to fulfill certain societal purposes. 4  The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the policy reason for the
homestead exemption, and for allowing the debtor to pay down on the
homestead mortgage, prior to the filing of bankruptcy, is to "[p]rotect[ ]
the family unit from impoverishment, relieve[ ] society [of] the burden
of supplying subsidized housing, and provide[ ] the debtors with a
means to survive during the period following the bankruptcy filing when
[the debtor] may have little or no income." 5
The exemption scheme may also serve one of the following social
policies:
(1) To provide the debtor with property necessary for his or
her physical survival;
(2) To protect the dignity and the culture and religious
identity of the debtor;
(3) To enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself or herself
financially and earn income in the future;
(4) To protect the debtor's family from adverse consequences
of impoverishment; and
(5) To shift the burden of providing the debtor and his or her
family with minimal financial support from society to the
debtor's creditors.6
3. Bertozzi v. Swisher, 81 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
IT]he fundamental reason for the enactment of exemption laws is to protect a person,
whatever his occupation might be, from being reduced by financial misfortune to abject
poverty; therefore, to accomplish that end and to encourage industry and thrift, laws of
that type have been framed which place beyond the reach of creditors not only the
debtor's home but also various kinds of personal property reasonably necessary for him
to have in order to earn a living for himself and his family; and from the beginning,
among the exemptions thus granted are to be found certain domestic animals, including a
limited number of horses. However, as pointed by those earlier cases, horses so exempt
are intended in good faith to be used as instruments of husbandry or labor; in other
words, they must be work horses.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920,925 (N.D. 1984). The court stated:
Exemptions statutes are remedial and are to be liberally construed to effectuate their
purpose of their enactment. Exemption statutes have two major objectives: To provide a
fresh start to the debtor who is being sued and to aid society by reducing the number of
debtors who would need public assistance.
Id. at 925 (citations omitted); see also In re Wallerstedt, 930 F.2d 630, 631 (8th Cir. 1991) (favoring
liberal construction of exemption statutes to benefit the debtor).
5. Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988).
6. In re Ellingson, 63 B.R. 271, 277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876.
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The policy consideration which purports to shift the loss from the
taxpayer and society to the creditor is cursory and therefore does not
support the existence of the exemption scheme because, in actuality,
society still bears the loss through increased prices of the creditor's
goods and services. 7 However, the policy provision which supports
debtor rehabilitation and provides the debtor's dependents with necessi-
ties during rehabilitation, does support the purpose behind the exemp-
tion scheme. Commenting on the necessity of the exemption scheme,
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Kumler,8 suggested that
this:
wise and humane policy [is] in the [best] interest of the state,
whose welfare and prosperity so largely depend[s] on the
growth and cultivation among its citizens[,] of feelings of
personal independence, together with love of country and
kindred-sentiments that find their deepest root and best
nourishment where the home life is spent and enjoyed.9
However, whether one accepts the policy reasons behind allowing
exemptions is irrelevant because exemptions, in whatever shape or form,
are a common thread of our society and will presumably always be
available to debtors. Even though some of the policy reasons behind
exemptions are important, this author does not agree with the various
types and amounts of exemptions that different states offer debtors.
Over the years, legislatures have altered their exemption schemes to
conform to changes and variances of society. 10 Therefore, re-examining
exemptions in light of societal changes, as this author suggests, is not a
new concept.
7. This policy argument may even be flawed by the fact that the debtor may not be on welfare
directly, but the debtor is being supported by the taxpayers, the taxpayers being the creditors that the
debtor owes. Because creditors obviously pass their losses on to their consumers through increased
prices of their product or services, other members of society pick up the loss of the particular debtor.
Therefore, indirectly, society bears the burden of these exemptions and to argue that shifting the
burden of the debtor and the debtor's family to the creditors and not to society, is no argument at all.
Society pays for the exemption either directly or indirectly.
8. 6 N.W. 618 (Minn. 1880).
9. Ferguson v. Kumler, 6 N.W. 618,619 (Minn. 1880). In In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir.
1989), the court recognized that the debtor's home is a "sanctuary" and reaffirmed the Denzer
position that stated "[wie have recognized that no exemption is more central to the legitimate aims of
state lawmakers than a homestead exemption." Johnson, 880 F.2d at 83 (citing Denzer v. Prendergast.
126 N.W.2d 440,443 (Minn. 1964)).
10. See Poznanovic v. Maki, 296 N.W. 415,417 (Minn. 1941) (determining that the specific term
"wagon" could not be interpreted to mean vehicle based on the legislative history); see also the recent
changes to N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. 1995) (providing additional exemptions such as





In many states, a debtor's right to exemptions does not come from
a statutory grant, but rather, is rooted in the state constitution. In North
Dakota, the constitution provides in pertinent part:
The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries
of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from
forced sale to all heads of families a homestead, the value of
which shall be limited and defined by law; and a reasonable
amount of personal property; the kind and value shall be fixed
by law. This section shall not be construed to prevent liens
against the homestead for labor done and materials furnished
in the improvement thereof, in such manner as may be pre-
scribed by law."I
Moreover, the Minnesota constitution provides:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt in this state, but this
shall not prevent the legislature from providing for imprison-
ment, or holding to bail, persons charged with fraud in con-
tracting said debt. A reasonable amount of property shall be
exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or
liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined
by law. Provided, however, that all property so exempt shall be
liable to seizure and sale for any debts incurred to any person
for work done or materials furnished in the construction, repair
or improvement of the same, and provided further, that such
liability to seizure and sale shall also extend to all real property
for any debt to any laborer, or service performed.12
Both constitutional provisions entitle the debtor to a reasonable
amount of property. Legislatures determine what constitutes a reason-
able amount of property. Although it appears that state constitutions
may provide for a homestead exemption, separate from personal proper-
ty, it does not limit the legislature's right to define the homestead. 13 The
North Dakota legislature established its definition of the homestead in
I1. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 22.
12. MINN. CONST. art. I,§ 12.
13. The legislature could allow a $25,000 homestead and $25,000 in personal property or
$50,000 in any form the individual chooses. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), (5) (1988) (listing dollar
amounts for exempt property); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(1) (Supp. 1995) (codifying the lien
against the homestead exemption).
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section 47-18-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, 14 which places a
dollar limitation on the exemption of contiguous property. Theoretical-
ly, in North Dakota, a debtor may claim as exempt, pursuant to section
47-18-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, property which encom-
passes several sections of land so long as the equity in the property does
not exceed $80,000 and the property consists of contiguous tracks.15
The Minnesota legislature set forth its definition of the homestead
exemption in section 510.01 of Minnesota Statutes Annotated,16 and
limited its definition in section 510.02.17 The federal bankruptcy court
for the District of Minnesota discussed the force of the homestead statute
in In re Joy'8 when it stated that the homestead exemption in Minnesota
is not simply a privilege but is a constitutionally guaranteed right,19 even
though the Minnesota Constitution 20 itself does not specifically mention
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (Supp. 1995). This section provides as follows:
The homestead of any person, whether married or unmarried, residing in this state shall
consist of the land upon which the claimant resides, and the dwelling house on that land
in which the homestead claimant resides, with all its appurtenances, and all other
improvements on the land, the total not to exceed eighty thousand dollars in value, over
and above liens or encumbrances or both. The homestead shall be exempt from
judgment lien and from execution or forced sale, except as otherwise provided in this
chapter. In no case shall the homestead embrace different lots or tracts of land unless
they are contiguous.
Id.
15. See In re Patten, 71 B.R. 574, 575-76 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (determining that the homestead
exemption could include a building consisting of apartments wherein debtors resided and rented out
the remaining apartments, as long as the equity did not exceed $80,000).
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.01 (West Supp. 1996). This section provides as follows:
The house owned and occupied by a debtor as the debtor's dwelling place, together with
the land upon which it is situated to the amount of area and value hereinafter limited and
defined, shall constitute the homestead of such debtor and the debtor's family, and be
exempt from seizure or sale under legal process on account of any debt not lawfully
charged thereon in writing, except such as are incurred for work or materials furnished
in the construction, repair, or improvement of such homestead, or for services performed
by laborers or servants and is as provided in section 550.175.
Id.
17. Id. § 510.02. This section provides as follows:
The homestead may include any quantity of land not exceeding 160 acres, and not
included in the laid out or platted portion of any city. If the homestead is within the laid
out or platted portion of a city, its area must not exceed one-half of an acre. The value
of the homestead exemption, whether the exemption is claimed jointly or individually,
may not exceed $200,000 or, if the homestead is used primarily for agricultural purposes,
$500,000, exclusive of the limitations set forth in section 510.05.
Id.
18. 5 B.R. 681 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
19. Joy v. Leonard (In re Joy), 5 B.R. 681, 683 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). Recently, in a case
involving a debtor who abandoned his homestead, the Minnesota Bankruptcy Court re-affirmed its
former position that "the homestead exemption is a guaranteed right." In re Kasden, 181 B.R. 390,
393 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Steiner & Saffer v. Kasden, 186 B.R. 667
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
20. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12; supra note 12 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant
portion of the Minnesota Constitution allowing for the creation of the exemption).
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the right to a homestead as does the North Dakota Constitution.21 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that the Minnesota
Constitution provides a fundamental right to a homestead exemption. 22
In Minnesota, the homestead exemption limits the debtor to 160 acres of
contiguous land if the property is not a platted portion of a city. 23 If the
homestead exists within a platted portion of a city, then the exempt
property cannot exceed one-half of an acre. 24 The value in either case
cannot exceed $200,000 for non-agricultural property, and $500,000 for
property primarily used for agricultural purposes. 25
Both legislatures adopted the above exemptions, along with various
other exemptions, pursuant to each state's constitutional provisions.
There are occasions, however, where the legislatures in Minnesota and
North Dakota created exemptions which the courts later found
unconstitutional .26
21. See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 22; supra note II and accompanying text (quoting the North
Dakota Constitution which provides the homestead exemption).
22. Panuska v. Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1989).
23. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (West Supp. 1996).
24. Id.
25. Id. This section has been amended twice in the last ten years. In 1986, the area for non laid
out or platted property outside the city went from 80 acres to 160 acres. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02
(West 1990). Then in 1993, the legislature limited the value to $200,000 or $500,000 if the debtor
used the homestead primarily for agricultural purposes. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (West Supp.
1996).
26. In re Bailey, 84 B.R. 608 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (holding the portion of MINN. STAT. ANN. §
550.37(22) that allowed an unlimited exemption for special damages in a personal injury action
unconstitutional); In re Hilary, 76 BR. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (holding the musical
instruments exemption under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(2) unconstitutional); Estate of Jones v.
Kvamme, 529 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 1995) (holding unconstitutional MINN. STAT. ANN. §
550.37(24)(1), which exempted certain retirement accounts because the value was not limited); In re
Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551,560 (Minn. 1987) (holding unconstitutional MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(11),
which allowed unlimited fraternal benefits). But see In re Cook, 138 B.R. 943, 944-45 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1992) (holding an exemption for a right of action for personal injuries unconstitutional for
special damages, but constitutional for general damages); In re McKeag, I I I B.R. 815, 817 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1990), (citing In re Lockhart, Bky. No. 3-87-1727 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988), affd sub nom
Iannacone v. Lockhart, 112 B.R. 962 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988)) (holding that the public employees
retirement exemption was constitutional since other integrated statutory provisions provide a
reasonable limitation on the amount of the exemption). If the musical instrument statute is
unconstitutional because it does not limit the value of the instrument, is the family bible exemption
statute also unconstitutional because it lacks any limitation? See MINN. STAT. A NN. § 550.37(2) (West
1988) (providing for no value limitation on the family bible). Is there a constitutional argument
concerning the separation of church and state? See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In
re Young), 148 B.R. 886. 896 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992), aff'd, 152 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Minn 1993)
(determining that contributions to a church were avoidable as fraudulent transfers). It is interesting to
note that the District Court for the District of North Dakota allowed a debtor to claim all of the
proceeds from a life insurance policy pursuant to N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-10-17 (1988). See In re
Hexom, 50 B.R. 324, 326 (D.N.D. 1984). Section 26-10-17 allowed all surrender value to be claimed
absolutely exempt from the claims of creditors of the insured. Id. at 325. Section 26-10-17 was
repealed in 1985, however, the language § 26-10-17 was very similar to the current language of §
28-22-03.1(3), which limits the amount of exempt insurance policy proceeds to what is reasonably
necessary for support. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(3) (Supp. 1995). Presumably, the parties did
not assert the constitutional limitation of a reasonable amount of personal property, the value and kind
to be fixed by law. See Hexom, 50 B.R. at 326.
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Pursuant to the social policies underlying exemption schemes, a
reasonable amount of property consists of the comforts and necessities
of life. This enables the debtor to continue working and to be a
productive member of society by providing for the debtor and the
debtor's family and protecting the family from destitution.
IV. TYPES OF EXEMPTIONS
Most states provide a hodge podge of different exemptions which
.the debtor may claim.27 For example, many states provide exemptions
for particular religious items, such as family bibles, places of worship,
and a burial right. 28 Other states have exemptions that are presumably
based on the average lifestyle of that state's citizens.29 For example, the
legislatures in Minnesota and North Dakota provide agricultural
exemptions and allow exemptions for farm machinery. 30
Other states allow various types of exemptions of which a debtor
may wish to take advantage. As previously noted, New Hampshire
provides exemptions for one hog and one pig, six sheep and the fleeces
of the same, a cow, a yoke of oxen, a horse, and domestic fowls. 31
Oklahoma provides exemptions for five milk cows and their calves under
27. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2 (1983 & Supp. 1995). New Hampshire allows, in
part, one hog and one pig and the pork of the same unslaughtered; six sheep and the fleeces of the
same; one cow and a yoke of oxen or a horse, when required for farming or teaming purposes or
other actual use; the bibles and school books and library of a debtor: a comfortable bed and bedsteads
and bedding for the debtor, his wife and children; the debtor's interest in a pew in a meeting house in
which he or she usually worships; and the debtor's right to a lot or a right of burial in any cemetery.
Id.
28. See ALA. CODE § 6-10-5 (1993) (providing exemptions for a pew in the place of worship and
any interest in a burial lot); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352b(c) (Supp. 1995); (providing an exemption for
a burial plot of the debtor and family); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(a) (1994) (providing exemptions
for the family bible, seat or pew at place of worship, and interest in burial plot); IOWA CODE ANN. §
627.6(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1995) (providing exemptions for the family bible and any interest in a public
or private burial ground); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2304(d) (1994) (providing an exemption for a burial
plot); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(2), (3) (West 1988) (providing exemptions for the family bible, a
pew, and burial lot); NEB. REV. STAT. § 12-605 (1991) (providing an exemption for a cemetery lot);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51 1:2(VIII), (XIV), (XV) (1983) (providing exemptions for the family bible,
the pew at the family place of worship, and a right of burial); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02(2)-(4)
(1991) (providing exemptions for a pew, a burial lot and the family bible); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §
1(4) (West 1991) (providing an exemption for a lot in the cemetery); TENN. CODE ANN. 26-2-103(3)
(1980) (providing an exemption for the family bible).
29. See, e.g., Poznanovic v. Maki, 296 N.W. 415, 417 (Minn. 1941) (recognizing that the
legislature provided exemptions to its citizens based upon "'their individual circumstances and
necessities, when the hour of misfortune overtakes them"' (quoting Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 89, 2
Gil. 72, 86 (1858))).
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(5) (Supp. 1996) (providing that an individual engaged in farming
may claim $13,000 in farm machinery and equipment). However, an individual not engaged in
agriculture is only entitled to tools, implements, and machinery not exceeding $8,000. Id. § 550.37(6).
See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-04(3) (1991) (providing exemption for livestock and farm
implements in the amount of $4,500).
31. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.2(X)-(XIII) (1983 & Supp. 1995).
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six months old, 100 chickens, two horses, two bridles and two saddles,
one gun, ten hogs, and 20 head of sheep. 32 The Kansas exemptions of
food, fuel, and clothing for the debtor, are consistent with the policy of
providing for the basic needs and necessities of the debtor and the
debtor's family. 33 New Hampshire also provides a fuel and food
exemption. 34 Idaho has a unique exemption which allows the debtor to
claim as exempt, not only wearing apparel, but also household pets. 35
Idaho recognizes water rights which are unique to that state.36
The Connecticut exemption scheme considers the debtor's health
and well being and provides exemptions for health aids necessary to the
debtor. 37 Connecticut also exempts wedding and engagement rings.38
Delaware allows sewing machines. 39 Texas allows exemptions of two
horses, a mule or donkeys, 12 head of cattle and 60 other types of
livestock, and 120 fowl along with the debtor's household pets.4 0
California is a more contemporary state and provides exemptions for
jewelry, heirlooms, works of art, and health aids. 41 Finally, there is a
group of states which recognizes a citizen's right to bear arms and
therefore each state provides a firearms exemption. 42
The above laundry list of exemptions provided to debtors in many
states reveals that the majority of states have a hodge podge exemption
scheme. This author does not attempt to address every exemption in
each and every state since there are a multitude of exemptions in North
Dakota and Minnesota alone. In North Dakota, the debtor may claim as
exempt cash value life insurance, annuities, or retirement plans up to the
value of $200,000.43 Moreover, North Dakota allows exemptions for a
homestead or, if the debtor does not have a homestead, the "in lieu of
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1(10), (12), (14), (15), (16) (West 1991).
33. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-2304(a) (1994).
34. N.H. REV. STAT. § 511:2 (VI) (1983). North Dakota has a similar statute which allows
exemptions for the debtor's food and fuel for a year. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02(6) (1991).
35. IDAHO CODE § 11-605(b) (1990).
36. Id. § 11-605(6).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b(k) (West 1991).
38. Id. § 52-352b(f).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(c) (1975).
40. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(10)-(l1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
41. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 704.040,704.050 (West 1987).
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52.352b(i) (exempting arms and military equipment, uniforms
owned by a member of the militia or armed forces); IDAHO CODE § 11-605(l)(a) (exempting a fire
arm); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § l(A)(14) (allowing exemption of a gun); TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. §
42.002(a)(7) (allowing exemption of two firearms).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(3) (1991). These would not include the plans which are
controlled by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as ERISA plans cannot be
attached or levied upon except as provided by federal law. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242,
2250 (1992). Therefore, the state exemption laws are pre-empted by federal law and a state statute
cannot prescribe the amounts exempt. Id. at 2245 (stating that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated"). Thus, ERISA qualified plans are
simply a "freebie."
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homestead exemption" which the debtor may apply to any type of
property.44 Further, North Dakota has a motor vehicle exemption
statute45 and has several other specific statutes which may relate to a
debtor's specific circumstances, such as benefits from Operation Shield
and Desert Storm,4 6 unemployment benefits,4 7 worker's compensation
benefits ,48 and crime victim reparations.49
Minnesota provides a homestead exemption,5 0 exemptions for
wearing apparel and household goods, 5 1 employee benefits and
retirement plans,52 and public assistance or relief received from a county
or state.5 3  Minnesota is also not without unique exemptions and
provides exemptions for the notary seal and official notary register.5 4 A
Vietnam bonus,55 and bail money in criminal proceedings, except for the
fine or criminal restitution that the criminal must pay, may also be
claimed as exempt. 56 Like many other states, the North Dakota and
Minnesota exemption statutes reflect a patchwork of societal changes,
and even though many of the exemptions fulfilled a concrete purpose in
the past, these exemptions today are antiquated and useless.
Furthermore, these exemptions encourage improper pre-bankruptcy
planning; a reshuffling of assets to fit some statutory scheme which does
not advance the policy reasons for exemptions.57
V. THE PIGEON HOLED EXEMPTIONS
A panoply of litigation has sprung out of the pigeon holed
exemptions that many states provide. The most litigated area is
pre-bankruptcy planning, where the debtor has property that is not
pigeon holed into what the exemption allows and, therefore, the debtor
must somehow convert the non-exempt asset into an exempt asset to save
it from the hands of the creditors on the eve of the bankruptcy, or on the
eve of attachment by the creditor.5 8 The unavailability of a specifically
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(1) (1991).
45. Id. § 28-22-03.1(2) (exempting a motor vehicle worth $1,200).
46. Id. § 37-26-06 (Supp. 1995).
47. Id. § 52-06-30 (1989).
48. Id. § 65-05-29 (1995).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-19(2) (1991).
50. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.01-510.09 (West 1990).
51. Id. § 550.37(4).
52. Id. § 550.37(24).
53. Id. § 550.37(14).
54. Id. § 359.03 (1991).
55. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 197.985 (1992).
56. Id. § 629.53 (1983).
57. See notes 3-10 supra and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons behind exemptions).
58. See Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 79 (8th Cir. 1989) (determining a debtor




tailored exemption forces the debtor to play games with his or her assets
on the eve of bankruptcy to ward off creditors.59
Through pre-bankruptcy planning, debtors are in a situation where
they may take advantage of all statutory exemptions, whether in the form
of musical instruments, annuities or homesteads. The debtor's pre
conversion assets would not be exempt, however, except that other
pigeon holes or exemptions, which a debtor may take advantage of, are
available.
For example, a debtor in Minnesota claiming the Minnesota
exemptions is not entitled to claim cash or firearms as exempt. A debtor
may however, take cash on the eve of bankruptcy and purchase a
homestead and claim the homestead as exempt. Furthermore, a debtor
could sell a firearm, use the cash from the sale to purchase a car, and
claim the car exempt. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the only
concern is whether the debtor has hindered, delayed, or defrauded his or
her creditors, in which case there would be no discharge.60
In the past, debtors have taken spare cash and on the morning of
filing bankruptcy, purchased a home, moved into the home at noon and
filed the petition in bankruptcy in the afternoon. 6 1 Most courts,
consistent with the liberal language of the homestead exemption and
exemptions in general, have allowed these actions because there is no
proof that the debtor made the purchase to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors .62
The current exemption schemes in North Dakota and Minnesota
create uncertainty. The debtor cannot know what the bankruptcy will
bring-whether the court will allow a debtor to claim a particular
59. See also Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 872-73 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying a
bankruptcy discharge to a debtor who transferred most of his net worth to exempt property, including
large annuities, on the eve of bankruptcy); Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866, 867
(8th Cir. 1988) (using cash from sales of their assets, debtors purchased exempt life insurance policies
and paid down their mortgage); Matter of Armstrong, 931 F.2d 1233, 1236 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing a
farm couple to convert non-exempt property to exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy because
there was no "extrinsic evidence of fraud"); Smith v. St. Luke's Hosp. of Fargo (In re Smith), 119 B.R.
714, 721 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) (using insurance proceeds to purchase an annuity policy on the eve of
bankruptcy); In re Pulos, 168 B.R. 682, 691 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) (determining that debtors' failure
to document the sale of $750.000 in real estate on the eve of bankruptcy denied them discharge in
bankruptcy).
1 60. See Tveten, 848 F.2d at 874 (noting that the debtor must intend to defraud creditors when
transferring property on the eve of bankruptcy to disallow the discharge); Johnson, 880 F.2d at 83
(noting that absent extrinsic evidence of fraud, there is nothing illegal about taking advantage of
exemptions).
61. Farrell v. Ernie Johnson, Civ. No. 6-88-594 (Bankr. D. Minn. July 21, 1989) (unpublished
opinion).
62. See, e.g., Hanson, 848 F.2d at 868 (stating that the court must find an intent to defraud
creditors to disallow transfer of property to exempt status).
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exemption 63 or whether the court will even grant a discharge. 6 4
Uncertainty also exists for creditors because they assume that the debtor
cannot exempt certain property but are then later surprised to find out
after the debtor completed pre-bankruptcy planning, most of the cash
assets the debtor previously held are no longer available to creditors for
collection and distribution. The parties are left with a substantial amount
of litigation to determine their rights in the property and determine
whether the debtor eluded creditors by hindering, delaying, or
defrauding them.
The pigeon holing of exemptions does nothing more than invite
litigation and necessitate sharp practice by attorneys to maneuver around
the practice of pigeon holing. 65 The resulting amount of litigation
simply makes no sense. Why should it matter that the debtor has
$50,000 worth of assets and those assets are held either in a homestead,
household goods, six sheep, one hog, one pig, or the pork of the same?
If the social policy behind the exemption scheme is to provide basic
necessities to the debtor and to keep the debtor and the debtor's family
from destitution, it should not matter at what time, or for what reason, the
debtor purchased the property. If the legislature entitled the debtor to a
certain dollar amount of exemptions, it would not matter what the debtor
claimed as exempt or when or where the debtor purchased the exempt
property. Uncertainty would disappear if the legislature simply provided
a specific dollar amount that a debtor could claim as exempt-and
nothing more. 66
VI. ONE "WILD CARD" EXEMPTION
Is it necessary to have well-defined and fact specific exemptions? Is
it necessary to provide exemptions for comfortable beds, family bibles,
63. See In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551, 560 (Minn. 1987) (determining exemption for annuity
contracts and unmatured life insurance unconstitutional because of their unlimited value); In re
Gagne, 166 B.R. 362, 364 (D. Minn. 1993) rev'd in part, 179 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994)
(determining debtor not entitled to exemption because annuity was not purchased "on account of'
illness, age, or disability); In re Raymond, 71 B.R. 628, 630 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (stating that an
annuity contract must be related to income to be exempt under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(24)); In re
Johnson, 108 B.R. 240, 244 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (determining that the debtors were not allowed an
exemption as a structured tort settlement, but entitled to the exemption as actual personal bodily
injury).
64. The court may deny the discharge because the pre-bankruptcy planning amounted to
hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors.
65. In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78. 82 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating extent of pre-bankruptcy planning);
Tveten, 848 F.2d at 875 (stating that the debtor consulted with attorneys to engage in pre-bankruptcy
planning); Hanson, 848 F.2d at 867 (noting that debtors sold assets and purchased others as part of
pre-bankruptcy planning).
66. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222 (West 1989) (providing that any purchase of an asset one
year before the debtor claims his or her exemptions is not allowed).
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annuities, 67 cash value life insurance, or the notary seal, or will a single
blanket exemption suffice? If the underlying social policy for
exemptions is to provide the debtor and the debtor's family with basic
necessities to enable the debtor to make a living and continue to provide
for the family, it does not make sense that the debtor should exempt
tools of his or her "trade" where the debtor may not be able to afford,
after bankruptcy, to work in that trade. 68 For example, if a debtor loses
substantial monies as a farmer, quite possibly that debtor may not want
to engage in the business of farming any longer. Why then, would the
debtor exempt $13,000 of farm machinery when the debtor has no real
intention of returning to farming, and where the debtor's only intent in
claiming the equipment is to convince the court that the $13,000 is a
necessary exemption? 69 Most likely, the debtor does not return to
farming, but takes advantage of a different profession where the debtor
believes he or she can make a better living.
The farmer is not the only example. The same is true of a
seamstress, a plumber, a pipefitter, or any other profession. There
should be no pigeon holing of these types of exemptions. If a debtor
wishes to take up a new profession, the debtor should not be penalized
by that wish. If a debtor wishes to exempt $13,000 in plumbing
equipment so that the debtor may remain a plumber, then the court
should acknowledge that wish and fulfill the purpose of the exemption,
if the underlying social policies of exemptions really mean anything.
On the other hand, why should one even engage in the discussion of
whether the debtor should be allowed $13,000 or $5,000 of tools of the
trade, whether the debtor should be allowed so many dollars for a sewing
machine, whether the debtor should be allowed six horses or ten horses,
or whether the family pet should be allowed as an exemption? The
legislature should not get involved in the debate of whether two firearms
are a necessity or whether twelve or fifteen head of cattle would be more
67. It is hard to imagine how $200,000 in annuities forwards the "policy" of maintaining the
debtor's necessities. The debtor is entitled to a fresh start but not a head start. Norwest Bank
Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Zouhar, 10 B.R. 154, 156 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1981); James Alan Lodoen, Pit Falls of Pre-Bankruptcy Planning, Preserving Assets and the
Discharge, 69 N.D. L. REV. 93, 111 (1993).
68. See In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786. 789 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (challenging debtors' exemption
for farm machinery where husband earned no income and wife was employed as a bookkeeper at a
grain elevator).
69. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(5) (West 1996); See In re LaFond, 791 F.2d 623,625-26 (8th Cir.
1986) (determining that debtor was a farmer and thus, his equipment could be exempted); In re
Schuette, 58 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. D. Minn 1986) (determining that a farmer may claim a farm
equipment exemption while not intending to immediately resume farming); In re Peters, 60 B.R. 711,
715 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (stating that a farmer may claim a MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(5) farm
equipment exemption though not intending to immediately resume farming); In re Fossem, 59 B.R. 820,
823 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (holding that a debtor could not increase the amount of his tools of the
trade exemption when subsequently revised by statute).
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beneficial to the debtor. Courts, on the other hand, should not be forced
to decide whether the purchase of the twelve head of cattle on the eve of
bankruptcy with cash that was not exempt, constitutes improper
pre-bankruptcy planning and therefore disallows the exemption or even
disallows the debtor's discharge. These are not useful discussions in
which either the legislature or the court should engage. Furthermore,
resorting to litigation on these issues does nothing to improve our system
or to benefit debtors or creditors.
The more logical approach to exemptions is to provide a single
exemption with a specific dollar limitation which the debtor can use in
any way he or she chooses. A close substitute to this statute is the "in
lieu of' homestead exemption in North Dakota, which allows the debtor,
if the debtor is not claiming the homestead exemption, to claim as
exempt, any property up to $7,500 in value.70 The same is true of
section 28-22-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, which allows the
debtor to claim $5,000 of any type of property without pigeon holing
the property into a particular exemption.71 Delaware also provides the
head of family exemption and allows the debtor to claim as exempt
personal property valued at $500 in "articles to be selected by the
debtor." 72
A court's involvement should not extend to the tedious task of
determining whether a Rolex watch or a wedding ring constitute wearing
apparel. Legislatures should enact statutes that simply entitle the debtor
to $50,000 equity in any property which the debtor owns. The necessity
for pre-bankruptcy planning would not exist because the debtor would
not have to consider whether cash or a firearm would be exempt, the
debtor would not have to worry about eight horses or 28 horses or
whether the debtor used those horses for recreational purposes or
income-producing purposes. The debtor could exempt any assets and
there would be no discussion about whether the assets claimed exempt fit
within the correct pigeon holed exemption. There would be no
discussion about whether the debtor properly claimed the annuity as
exempt73 and the debtor would know where he or she stood on all other
exemptions.
Although it is arguable that this proposal increases costs to litigants
by creating fact-based issues and valuation issues, such arguments are
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(1) (1995).
71. Id. § 28-22-03.
72. DEL. CODE ANN. § tit. 10, § 4903 (Supp. 1994).
73. See In re Johnson, 108 B.R. 240, 244 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989) (determining annuity not properly
claimed exempt); In re Gagne, 163 B.R. 819, 824 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 172 B.R.
50 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) (determining worker's compensation benefits exempt prior to bankruptcy,
but not exempt afterwards).
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not unique. The system today fosters the same problems of making
fact-based determinations and valuation considerations to fit property
within the current exemption scheme. For example, in North Dakota, if
a debtor claimed the in lieu of homestead exemption, the debtor must
determine whether the assets exceed the $7,500 limit.74 Moreover, if the
debtor claims the homestead exemption in North Dakota, a
determination of whether the valuation of the property exceeds $80,000
must be made. 75 In Minnesota, a debtor may have to determine the
valuation of the property so that it does not exceed the statutory limits
and if the property has an unlimited value, the statutory scheme may
even be unconstitutional. 76  There would be no issue concerning
pre-bankruptcy planning nor any litigation to decide whether the debtor
improperly converted certain property on the eve of bankruptcy. All
parties involved would know that the statute automatically entitled the
debtor to a certain dollar amount of exemption in whatever property the
debtor chooses.
VII. CONCLUSION
The societal purpose of exemptions is to provide necessary property
for the physical survival of the debtor; to protect the dignity, culture, and
religious identity of the debtor; to enable the debtor to rehabilitate
financially and to provide for the debtor's family; and to protect the
debtor and the debtor's family from impoverishment. Each of these
policies can be fulfilled by providing a single wild card exemption where
the debtor would determine what property the debtor wishes to keep to
fit the debtor's needs. It is not necessary for the legislature to dictate
what the debtor should and should not be allowed to claim as exempt.
By allowing a single wild card exemption to the debtor, the issue of
pre-bankruptcy planning disappears and it is not necessary to consider
whether the debtor, by his or her actions, hindered, delayed, or
defrauded creditors. A single wild card exemption scheme would be
more efficient and less litigious. Hopefully the legislature and the courts
will consider the single wild card exemption as a functional alternative to
the current exemption scheme.
74. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 28-22-03.1(1) (1991).
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (1995).
76. In re Hilary, 76 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (determining MINN. STAT. ANN. §
550.37(2), exempting musical instruments, unconstitutional because the statute did not limit the value).
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